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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of free or low-cost investment apps has
disrupted the financial industry in recent years. Major brokerage
firms have been pressured to go to zero fees due to intense
competition from their fintech counterparts. While these apps
have extended their products and services to those underserved by
traditional brokers, some of their practices raise consumer
protection concerns. Namely, the practice of “payment for order
flow,” which helps fintech startups sustain a zero-commission
model, could lead to subordinating customers’ best interest to
market makers who acquire their retail orders from these fintech
startups. Further, “cash management accounts,” newly popular
among fintech startups with an ambition to compete with
chartered banks raise questions about the use of idle customer
assets and the protections afforded to these accounts in case of
liquidation. This Note considers the products and services of these
investment apps in the context of existing U.S. regulations and
regulators for broker-dealers, investment advisors, and chartered
banks. To illustrate this, this Note analyzes the potential consumer
financial protection issues arising out of these fintech-based
investment platforms’ distinctive business models and the services
they provide.

INTRODUCTION
Robinhood, Acorns, Betterment, Stash, and other free or low-cost
investment apps make it easier than ever for every smartphone user to
invest on the go, with zero experience and little more than pocket change.
These kinds of apps are exploding right now, appealing mainly to young
people because of their “low barriers to entry, automation and familiar tapswipe-buy, Tinder-style interface.”2 For almost all of these apps, all users
have to do is first download the app, then set up a profile that lets the
company behind the app know the best kinds of investment suitable for
the user’s risk averseness and return expectations, and finally connect a
bank account to give access to some funds and be done.
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Fintech is defined as “technology-enabled innovation in financial
services that could result in new business models, applications, processes
or products with an associated material effect on the provision of financial
services.”3 With people now spending almost seven times longer on apps
than on mobile sites and mobile use accounting for an ever-larger portion
of the time people spend online, the spurt of investment apps is a logical
development for the fintech industry. 4 Offering an improved user
experience and greater command over different aspects of money
management, investment apps are considered by many users as a practical
and economical way of managing their finances. However, by targeting
underserved and less sophisticated investors, these low-cost or “free” apps
can also threaten less vigilant app users who previously lacked exposure
to the investing world.
With so many investment apps, online exchanges, and brokerages,
there are ostensibly an infinite amount of options for people to invest in
everything from stocks to exchange-traded funds (ETFs) to
cryptocurrency. The poster child for one of these fast-growing, low-cost
(or free) online investment platforms is Robinhood. This app boasts a feefree model that provides minimal to no cost trading for its customers.5 “As
part of its easily-accessible, trading-for-the-people model, Robinhood
doesn’t require an account minimum to trade, and offers commission-free
trades for users,” contrary to most conventional investment firms. 6
However, much like a traditional broker-dealer, Robinhood operates under
a decent amount of regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA).7 The same regulators also have jurisdiction over robo-advisors,
such as Betterment, a low-cost wealth management company that mostly
provides its automated investing service through an app as well.8
The proliferation of these free or low-cost investment apps has
disrupted the financial industry in recent years. Major brokerage firms
have been pressured to eliminate fees. Since Robinhood offered stock
trading for free in 2013,9 Vanguard Group slashed fees on ETF trades, and
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J.P. Morgan Chase started its own free trading app.10 In October 2019,
traditional broker-dealers, the likes of Interactive Brokers, Charles
Schwab, TD Ameritrade, and E*Trade announced, within less than a week
of one another, that they would cut commissions to zero. 11 While
Robinhood does not directly collect commissions from customer’s trading
activities, it does monetize through a variety of other avenues including
“marginal interest and lending, premium accounts and rebates.”12 One of
the more controversial channels is “payment for order flow,” where online
brokerages outsource the execution of their app users’ orders to firms that
pay for the right to handle those trades in exchange for a fee. 13 “All
brokerage firms that sell order flow are required by the SEC to disclose
who they sell order flow to and how much they pay.”14
Even though all these fintech startups offered more specialized
and tailored products from their inception, most of them have bigger
aspirations and wish to replace conventional players in the financial
industry eventually and become customers’ central financial partner. SoFi,
Inc., for example, has expanded its services and product lines to
mortgages, life insurance, and wealth management, together with student
loan refinancing, the startup’s focus when it launched.15 Robinhood, now
with more than six million users, has rolled out a high-yield cash
management account and ultimately wants to become a federally chartered
national bank. 16 These new commercial banking products and services
elicit new regulatory concerns regarding consumer protection.
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I. FINTECH AND THE RISE OF INVESTMENT APPS
A. How Fintech Start-Ups Innovated and Disrupted the Online
Brokerage and Robo-Adviser Market
The advent of fintech promises to reshape the financial industry
by reducing costs, improving the quality of financial services, and creating
“a more diverse, secure and stable financial services landscape.”17 “The
use of digital technologies [and big data in fintech] makes it possible to
provide many existing financial services more efficiently and to enhance
these services.” 18 S&P Global divides fintech activities into six types:
payments, financial media and data solutions, banking technology,
insurance technology, digital lending, and investment and capital markets
technology. 19 Of the six fintech subsectors that S&P Global Market
Intelligence tracks, the investment and capital markets technology
subsector produced the most transactions in 2017, totaling roughly $181
billion in assets under management (AUM).20 The AUM in the subsector
is projected to be $608 billion in 2022.21
The move to low-fee and even no-fee models is a common theme
among retail-focused apps in the investment and capital markets
technology subsector. Among the field, Robinhood stands out as one of
the fastest-growing investment apps since introducing its commission-free
business model in 2015.22 Meanwhile, incumbents such as Fidelity and
Charles Schwab have since cut their equity and ETF commissions.23 The
free or low-cost model is considered one of the truly disruptive changes in
the investment technology landscape, and its impact appears to be
ongoing. For instance, JPMorgan’s You Invest, launched in August 2018,
offers customers 100 commission-free online stock and ETF trades. 24
Further, fintech startups like Robinhood are willing to waive commissions
17
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if they could amass a larger customer base as a result.25 That is because,
with a large pool of active users, fintech startups can still sustain
themselves by tapping into several other revenue streams available to
traditional brokers, including “securities lending, interest on cash held in
brokerage accounts, margin lending and routing order flow to
exchanges.”26
Fintech startups in the investment and capital markets technology
subsector also can differentiate themselves from their traditional
counterparts with “personalized niche services, data-driven solutions, an
innovative culture, and a nimble organization.”27 They have little to lose,
can innovate rapidly, and do not fear mistakes. Fintech startups are also
willing to accept more feedback from their users and focus on interfaces
that maximize customer experience. 28 An important factor that enables
fintech firms to innovate more rapidly is that the digital technologies they
rely on have huge built-in economies of scale.29 With digital technologies,
the marginal cost of one more customer is generally trivial. Therefore, as
long as these firms have a large enough client base to ensure that their total
revenue is larger than their total cost, which doesn’t increase by much as
more users sign up for their products, they do not have to predicate the
availability of their products on the basis that every user individually has
to contribute to their revenues. That leads to one of the most significant
advantages to these digital-exclusive micro-investing platforms: they can
afford to let users bypass brokerage account minimums and extend their
products to those underserved by traditional brokers because of the user’s
lack of funds.30

B. Overview of the Regulatory Framework for Online BrokerDealers and Robo-Advisors
Fintech firms have been provided with a favorable regulatory
environment since the 2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, traditional
financial institutions have been subject to more rigorous regulation, capital
requirements, and reporting requirements from regulators since 2008.
“The looser regulatory requirements imposed on fintech startups allow
them to provide more customized, inexpensive, and easy-to-access
financial services to consumers than traditional institutions.” 31 The
predominant revenue sources for these online broker-dealers and roboadvisors are individual customers and small and medium-sized
enterprises,32 therefore making consumer protection a focal point of the
regulatory scheme around them.
25

See Darden, supra note 19, at 5.
Id.
27
In Lee & Yong Jae Shin, Fintech: Ecosystem, Business Models, Investment
Decisions, and Challenges, 61 BUSINESS HORIZONS 35, 36 (2017).
28
See Anirban Bose, Penry Price, & Vincent Bastid, World FinTech Report 2018,
Capgemini, LinkedIn & Efma 1, 19 (2018), https://www.capgemini.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/world-fintech-report-wftr-2018.pdf.
29
Stulz, supra note 18.
30
See Jolly, supra note 2.
31
See Lee & Shin, supra note 27, at 37–38.
32
Id.
26

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

48

Fintech startups face different regulatory requirements based on
the type of financial services they provide. For instance, Robinhood, as a
broker-dealer, is regulated by the SEC. 33 Additionally, the app is a
voluntary member of FINRA34, a self-regulatory organization (SRO) that
oversees many brokerages. Therefore, along with other similar investment
apps, Robinhood is required to deal fairly with their customers and have a
fiduciary duty “under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
and SRO rules, including SRO rules relating to just and equitable
principles of trade and high standards of commercial honor.”35
An important aspect of a duty of fair dealing to their clients is the
suitability obligation, which requires a broker-dealer to make
recommendations consistent with customer interests.36 Broker-dealers are
also required under certain circumstances, such as when making a
recommendation, to disclose material conflicts of interest to their
customers, in some cases at the time of the transaction’s completion.37
“The federal securities laws and FINRA rules restrict broker-dealers from
participating in certain transactions that may present particularly acute
potential conflicts of interest.”38
Money on Robinhood is also protected by the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC), which protects up to $250,000 for cash
claims and $500,000 for securities. 39 FINRA and SEC report to SIPC
concerning member broker-dealers who are in or approaching financial
difficulty. 40 “If SIPC determines that the customers of a member require
the protection afforded by the Act, it initiates steps to commence a
customer protection proceeding.”41
Other digital investment apps providing automated, algorithmdriven investment services with little to no human supervision, like Acorns
or Betterment, are considered robo-advisors and must register with the
SEC as “Registered Investment Advisors” (RIA). Most robo-advisor apps
are members of FINRA as well, and depending on the services they offer,
may have a separate entity as a broker-dealer to execute their users’
trades.42 Assets managed by robo-advisors are not insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as they are securities held for
investment purposes, not bank deposits. 43 However, assets managed by
33

See Sraders, supra note 5.
Id.
35
SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISORS AND BROKER-DEALERS iv (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/files/913studyfinal.pdf.
36
Id. at 59.
37
See id. at 60.
38
Id. at iv.
39
See Lorie Konish, Robinhood Debate Highlights the Difference between FDIC
and SIPC Protection, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com
/2018/12/14/robinhood-debate-highlights-differences-in-fdic-and-sipcprotections.html.
40
SIPC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2019), https://www.sipc.org/media/annualreports/2018-annual-report.pdf.
41
Id. at 4.
42
See Betterment Res. Ctr., supra note 8.
43
See Konish, supra note 39.
34

49

Consumers Beware

[Vol. 19

robo-advisor apps are typically protected by the SIPC for up to $500,000
per account against missing assets.44
As RIAs, these robo-advisors have a fiduciary duty to serve their
app users best interests, including an obligation not to subordinate the
user’s interests to their own.45 A robo-adviser “that has a material conflict
of interest must either eliminate that conflict or fully disclose to its users
all material facts relating to the conflict.” 46 Further, the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 “prohibits an investment adviser, acting as principal
for its own account, from effecting any sale or purchase of any security for
the account of a client, without disclosing certain information to the client
in writing before the completion of the transaction and obtaining the
client’s consent.”47
The rise of digital investment and personal finance startups` could
pose a set of unique challenges to financial regulation. Fintech startups
present a particularly acute problem from a systemic risk perspective.48
Their size and business models leave them more vulnerable to adverse
economic shocks than large financial institutions, and those shocks are
more likely to spread to other firms in the industry.49

II. THE PRICE OF COMMISSION-FREE TRADING: THE “PAYMENT FOR
ORDER FLOW” MODEL
A. The “Race to Zero:”: Elimination of Online Trading
Commissions
Due to the built-in economies of scale of fintech startups and the
digital technology they employ, the marginal cost of serving one more
customer is generally smaller than the same marginal cost for more
established competitors. Investment apps, including Robinhood and
Acorns, have accumulated and drawn millions of users, mostly younger
people, by marketing themselves with commission-free or low-cost
investing and being mobile-friendly.50 Conversely, since the start of 2013,
the year of Robinhood’s launch, traditional broker-dealers have seen a
lower return for their investors, partially due to the increased competition
from fintech startups with a zero-commission business model. 51 For
instance, both Charles Schwab and TD Ameritrade have had returns below
S&P 500 levels since 2013, averaging 11 percent per year. 52 Charles
44

See id.
See STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISORS AND BROKER-DEALERS, supra note 35,
at iii.
46
See id.
47
Id.
48
William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1171–72
(2018).
49
Id. at 1172.
50
Sraders, supra note 5; see also Dan DeFrancesco, Investing App Acorns Nabbed
$105 Million in Funding and Now Has a Higher Valuation than Robo Giant
Betterment,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Jan.
28,
2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/acorns-raises-105-million-in-funding-2019-1.
51
See Fitzgerald, supra note 10.
52
Id.
45

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

50

Schwab returned a ,mere 7.9% between 2013 and 2019, while TD
Ameritrade fared worse at just below 5% a year in the same period.53
Dubbed the “Robinhood effect,” the intense competition from
digital investment and personal finance apps have pressured major
brokerages to eliminate transaction fees, with many cutting commissions
altogether.54 So how can fintech startups like Robinhood sustain this zerocommission model without incurring huge losses or going bust?
Without receiving any commission directly from its app users,
Robinhood can still tap several other revenue streams available to brokerdealers: “securities lending, interest on cash held in brokerage accounts,
margin lending and routing order flow to exchanges.”55 In particular, the
practice of sending customer orders to high-frequency traders in exchange
for cash is a controversial but legal in the brokerage industry known as
“payment for order flow.”56 Robinhood credited this practice as the reason
they made free trading possible: “The revenue we receive from these
rebates helps us cover the costs of operating our business and allows us to
offer commission-free trading.” 57 In fact, the app was bringing in more
than 40% of its revenue in early 2018 from selling its customers’ orders to
high-frequency trading firms or market makers, like Citadel Securities and
Two Sigma Securities.58

B. The “Payment for Order Flow” Practice and Its Risk to
Consumers
“Payment for order flow” is the widespread practice in which
over-the-counter (“OTC”) market makers make cash payments to retail
brokerage firms in exchange for marketable retail customer order flow.59
These market makers are typically large financial institutions that act as
wholesalers by buying and selling securities to satisfy the
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market.60 Market makers earn most of their revenues by charging a spread
on the buy and sell price and transacting on both sides of the market.61
Investors who want to buy securities get charged the asking price, which
is always set marginally higher than the market price. 62 The spreads
between the price investors receive and the market prices are the profits
for the market makers.63
Market makers are particularly interested in order flow from the
retail sector because retail investors are, on average, less informed than
other traders about short-term price fluctuations. 64 Therefore, trading
against retail investor order flow enables market makers to take advantage
of information asymmetries between market participants and reliably
profit from people who are not professional traders.65 “Typically, dealers
that pay to receive retail customer order flow will guarantee executions of
that order flow with some amount of average price improvement over the
national best bid or offer (“NBBO”) and with a separate payment to retail
brokers for directing customer orders to them.”66
The SEC has stated that a broker-dealer does not necessarily
violate its best-execution obligation merely because it receives payment
for order flow.67 At the same time, the SEC has stated that the existence of
payment for order flow raises the potential for conflicts of interest for
broker-dealers handling customer orders.68 To date, the SEC has pursued
an approach based primarily on disclosure to address concerns about the
potential conflicts of interest caused by the practice of “payment for order
flow.”69
As the SEC has stressed, a broker-dealer’s order-routing decisions
are subject to its duty of best execution.70 That duty requires a broker to
seek to execute a customer’s order at the most favorable terms reasonably
available under the circumstances. 71 Broker-dealers must also conduct
regular and rigorous reviews of their order-routing practices and execution
quality.72
60
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There can be material economic incentives for a broker to send its
marketable retail orders to market makers that pay for order flow. “These
economic incentives create potential conflicts with a broker’s duty of best
execution and may cause observers to question the rigor with which a
broker seeks to obtain the best execution for its customer orders.” 73
Without payment for order flow, it is possible that market makers could
have been motivated to quote more competitively, which means retail
investors could have received better prices for their orders.74 The other
side of the argument claimed that the practice of payment for order flow
benefit investors indirectly “by subsidizing low commission rates and
other services the customers receive from their brokers.”75 Additionally,
retail marketable orders routed pursuant to payment for order flow
arrangements are generally executed at a faster pace and more often than
not at the NBBO or better.76

C. Robinhood’s Substantial Engagement in the Practice of
“Payment for Order Flow”
According to Robinhood’s Fourth Quarter 2019 SEC Rule 606
Disclosure Report, no customers specifically instructed their orders routed
to a particular venue for execution. 77 Conversely, that quarter, TD
Ameritrade routed only 32% of its customer’s orders to market makers.78
Per Robinhood’s quarterly report, users’ trades were all routed to highfrequency traders like Citadel Securities (65.5%), Wolverine Securities
(11.66%), and Virtu Americas (6.82%).79 Of these market makers, Citadel
was fined $22 million by the SEC for securities law violations in 2017;80
Wolverine Securities paid a $1 million fine to the SEC for insider
trading;81 and as of December 2018, Virtu Americas settled disciplinary
proceedings involving more than 50,000 instances of trading violations
and was censured by FINRA for trading violations.82
Not only does Robinhood engage in the practice of payment for
order flow, but the company appears to be selling their app users’ orders
for over ten times as much as other brokerages who engage in the

73
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practice. 83 Among broker-dealers that route their order flow to market
makers, the practice typically only constitutes a small percentage of their
revenue.84 But for Robinhood, selling customers’ orders to high-frequency
trading firms constituted more than 40% of its revenue. 85 More
concerningly, unlike any other brokerages, in 2018, the app started filing
Rule 606 disclosures on order flow payments for dollars traded rather than
shares traded, making it impossible to compare Robinhood’s payments
with others.86
In the Third Circuit case Newton v Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith,87 the court held that “[t]he duty of best execution . . . requires
that a broker-dealer seek to obtain for its customer orders the most
favorable terms reasonably available under the circumstances.” In that
case, the market maker executed their customer’s orders at the NBBO
price when they knew that price was inferior, and at the same time, they
were trading at the more favorable price for their own accounts. 88 The
court ruled that brokerages are not allowed to inflate their profit margins
at the expense of their investor clients in this way.89
Although Robinhood itself does not seem to be engaging in the
same practice as the market maker in Newton, the high-frequency traders
they sell to are essentially using Robinhood as an intermediary without
directly breaching their duty of best execution since these orders are routed
to them and not directly from the app users, taking advantage of the retail
investors by only offering the NBBO price instead of the best price they
can obtain. Glaringly, Robinhood has a substantial conflict of interest here:
the company has the duty of best execution to obtain for its users the most
favorable price reasonably available. But at the same time, Robinhood is
getting significant rebates from these high-frequency traders, which use
their technological advantage to exploit the order flow they get indirectly
from retail investors who use Robinhood. Robinhood in turn benefits from
indulging in this practice, since the significant revenue it gets supports the
company’s commission-free business model and helps expand its client
base.
In fact, Robinhood was fined $1.25 million fine by one of its
regulators in December 2019, FINRA, which charged the brokerage with
not following “best execution” practices from October 2016 to November
2017. 90 FINRA charged that in this timeframe, Robinhood did not
reasonably consider where it could find the highest-quality trades for its
83
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users, focusing only on existing routing partners that paid Robinhood for
orders instead of exploring alternatives. 91 It further commented that
brokerages that engage in the practice of “payment for order flow” are
obliged to either conduct an order-by-order review or implement a
“regular and rigorous” review program.92 Robinhood responded that this
is no longer a problem for its current users and that the company had since
implemented a better way to match traders with best-execution practices.93
Robinhood has also claimed in December 2019 that it is also a
clearing broker and does not need to route its users’ trades to market
makers. 94 However, as of its latest quarterly report, Robinhood is still
routing all its users’ trades to high-frequency traders.95

III. BRANCHING INTO COMMERCIAL BANKING: WHAT LIES AHEAD?
There is a growing trend of fintech startups adding banking
options to their product and service offerings. In recent years, Robinhood,
Coinbase, and Circle have announced their intentions to pursue national
banking charters.96 No doubt, these apps hope to build a larger user base
on top of its existing millions of users by leveraging software scalability
to provide more competitive returns and pricing than the traditional
players in the banking sector. But so far, fintech startups have made scant
progress toward winning banking charters, particularly as regulator
concerns over digital financial services have grown.97 Some members of
the U.S. Federal Reserve have voiced concerns over fintech’s risk
management capabilities.98 Consequently, fintech startups with ambitions
of operating a full-service bank have few alternatives to pursue.
In December 2018, Robinhood unveiled its no-fee checking and
savings accounts with no minimums, ATM fees, penalty charges, or
foreign transaction fees. 99 Noticeably, the app was also offering a 3%
interest rate, which was well above the industry average 0.08% yield on
U.S. checking accounts and the 0.1% average on savings accounts. 100
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However, the fine print on its website inconspicuously stated that the
offering was not a bank account.101 Robinhood stated in its disclosures that
these “checking and savings accounts” would have been covered by the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). 102 But these new
products saw swift opposition from regulators who questioned the
promised SIPC insurance, which is meant for brokerage accounts—not for
savings products. 103 Only a day after its launch, Robinhood said they
would re-brand and re-name these products after the “confusion.”104
To engage in the business of banking—taking deposits and
making loans—fintech startups typically require a bank charter in their
name.105 The bank charter comes with some major benefits. Under existing
U.S. law, only chartered depository institutions have exclusive rights to
take insured deposits from the public, which provides an extremely cheap
source of funding.106 Besides, insured depository institutions (IDIs) can
also export interest rates nationwide under the Exportation Doctrine, since
expanded to permit state and national banks to preempt a various states’
consumer-financial-protection laws.107
The absence of a bank charter also means that fintech startups
cannot avail itself of the preemption powers, forcing them to comply with
the laws of each state in which they intend to provide their banking
services.108 Consequently, the most common business model for startups
has been to enter into a partnership with a relatively small chartered bank,
enabling them to operate on a much wider scale without the added burden
of state-by-state compliance. 109 Robinhood, SoFi, Betterment,
Wealthfront, and CreditKarma have all launched FDIC-insured, highyield accounts this year by partnering with a bank.110
These high-yield cash management accounts and savings accounts
have similarities. They “sweep” customers’ money from a brokerage
account into various FDIC-insured bank accounts.111 Because these firms
deposit the money across multiple banks, the insurance can be higher than
the standard $250,000 offered per bank. In Robinhood’s case, accounts are
insured up to $1.25 million. 112 Robinhood said its partners include
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Goldman Sachs, HSBC Bank, Wells Fargo Bank, Citibank, Bank of
Baroda, and U.S. Bank.113
There are two potential consumer protection issues for these appbased “cash management accounts” or “sweep programs.” The first is
broker-dealers’ use of idle customer assets. The second concerns the
different SIPC and FDIC protections afforded to these accounts in case of
liquidation.
Regarding the first issue, SEC Rule 15c3-3(e) requires that
broker-dealers place all customer cash in a separate bank account titled the
“Special Reserve Bank Account for the Exclusive Benefit of
Customers.” 114 Broker-dealers can circumvent the requirement to place
customer funds into a “Special Reserve Account for the Exclusive Benefit
of Customers” by “sweeping” customer cash off their books and
depositing the funds into either a bank or a money market fund.115 This
explains high interest “cash management accounts” offered by these
fintech startups. Current SEC rules protect customers by ensuring that they
are informed about sweep programs before their funds are swept. 116
Although FINRA has not finalized its sweep program rules, the selfregulatory organization has proposed rules which would strengthen the
existing SEC customer protection requirements by requiring that
customers know the most important terms of the sweep products, namely
the interest rate and the sweep counterparty.117
Affiliate banks incentivize investment apps to encourage users to
participate in so-called “cash management accounts” by offering paid fees
or other benefits to sweep customer cash even if sweeping their uninvested
cash is not in the best interest of the users. Depending on users’ risk profile,
returns may not adequately compensate them for the counterparty risk
created by sweeping the cash.118 Additionally, these investment apps could
also choose banks and money market funds that pay higher fees or offer
more benefits for their future development but lower returns to customers
when compared to the industry.119 Right now, per SEC and FINRA rules,
the onus is on users’ and not the app to understand the risks associated
with sweep programs.120
The second issue concerns the difference between SIPC and FDIC
protections. In December 2018, when Robinhood rolled out its no-fee
checking and savings accounts with 3% interest rate, it disclosed that the
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accounts would be covered by the SIPC.121 However, SIPC’s CEO swiftly
responded that it would not insure checking and savings accounts the way
Robinhood had claimed. 122 Consequently, Robinhood retracted that
controversial launch, and returned in October 2019 to offer cash
management accounts, which are similar to savings accounts.123 This time
around, the product is covered by the FDIC rather than the SIPC through
Robinhood’s partnership with various chartered banks.124
This debacle highlighted the crucial difference between the
protections offered by the FDIC and SIPC. The FDIC, which began
operations in 1933, administers deposit insurance and the fund reserved to
protect deposits and resolve failed banks, known as the Deposit Insurance
Fund.125 After the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the standard maximum
deposit insurance amount is $250,000 per ownership account category, per
depositor, per institution. 126 Therefore, the FDIC insures individual
deposits in one insured bank separately from individual deposits in another
separately chartered insured bank. 127 For example, if a person has a
certificate of deposit at Bank A and has a certificate of deposit at Bank B,
the amounts would each be insured separately up to $250,000. 128
However, funds deposited in separate branches of the same insured bank
are not separately insured.129
Conversely, SIPC, on the other hand, was created by the Securities
Investor Protection Act in 1970 to protect a broker-dealer’s customer from
the loss of cash and securities if the broker-dealer has to be liquidated.130
SIPC’s guarantees apply only to the broker-dealer’s custody function,
which means SIPC only would cover customers’ cash and securities in
their brokerage accounts when the firm enters liquidation.131 SIPC’s CEO,
therefore, determined that its insurance would not apply to “checking and
savings accounts” of Robinhood because the insurance saw the money put
into these accounts as loans by customers to the investment app, and not
cash or securities that are in their brokerage accounts. 132 Additionally,
SIPC does not insure individuals in the event their securities’ value
declines. 133 It also does not cover consumers who were sold worthless
121
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investments, received bad advice, or steered toward inappropriate
investments . 134 These carve-outs and caveats further highlight SIPC’s
diminished consumer protections compared to the FDIC. So, before
signing up for a new “cash management account,” users should read the
fine print and carefully choose their insurance coverage in the event their
chosen finance app’s company goes into liquidation.
Another area to keep an eye on for the future regulatory landscape
is the proposed special charter for non-bank fintech companies (the
“fintech charter”) by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
as a possible avenue for fintech firms to access the nationwide financial
system without having be licensed in all 50 states.135 The so called “fintech
charter” was recently struck down by a judge of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, holding that the fintech
charter is beyond the OCC’s authority.136 The fate of the charter however,
is still pending from an appeal by the OCC.137

CONCLUSION
Low-cost or free investment apps are here to stay. Despite
increased scrutiny of risk management and consumer protections
practices, dubious behaviors and shady revenue streams remain the
lifeblood of fintech startups. As they continue to generate higher
investment returns and supplant established industry players,
confrontations with regulators like FINRA will become increasingly
common. Robinhood was FINRA’s first causality for failing to follow its
fiduciary duties, but it will surely not be the last.138 The rise of “cash
management accounts” and associated “sweep programs” promise to be
new hotbeds for trouble in the consumer protection space.
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